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JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF ACADEMIC
TENURE: AN EXAMINATION
Alan A. Matheson*
In recent years, critical attacks on higher education have focused
upon tenure of faculty members and have mounted in both volume
and intensity. As a result, there has been an agonizing reappraisal of
the whole subject of academic tenure.' The concept of tenure in the
teaching profession, 2 though subject to varied definition, eligibility
and legal basis, includes a basic element: a measure of employment
security.3 Tenured faculty members enjoy the assurance of continued
employment which can be terminated only by means of procedural
due process and for reasons of extreme misconduct or program cur-
tailment. In addition, tenure is af important guarantee of academic
freedom,4 protecting as well as attracting qualified teachers. To the
faculty member, tenure also entails a "kind of communal acceptance
into the professorial guild." 5
Although there is no uniform system in higher education, tenure
* Associate Dean, Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law;
B.A., 1953, M.S., 1957, J.D., 1959, University of Utah.
1. See generally COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, FACULTY
TENURE (1973) [hereinafter cited as FACULTY TENURE]; B. SMITH, THE TENURE DEBATE
(1973).
2. A survey of tenure programs at institutions of higher education may be found
in C. BYSE & L. JOUGHIN, TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: PLANS, PRACTICES,
AND THE LAW 9-70 (1959); B. SHAW, ACADEMIC TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION(1971). The "standard" tenure plan is outlined in American Ass'n. of Univ. Profes-
sors & Ass'n. of American Colleges, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Free-
dom and Tenure, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 33 (L. Joughirt ed. 1967). See
also Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045
(1968).
3. But the essential characteristic of tenure is continuity of service, in that the
institution in which the teacher serves has in some manner relinquished the free-
dom or power it otherwise would possess to terminate the teacher's services.
Byse, Academic Freedom, Tenure and the Law: A Comment on Worzella v. Board of
Regents, 73 HARv. L. REV. 304, 305 (1959).
4. A. Van Alstyne, Tenure System at the University of Utah, in THE TENURE
DEBATE 77 (B. Smith ed. 1973); R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 456 (1955). Lack of a power to make
a contract other than one terminable at will would "seriously handicap the university
in its effort to secure men of competence to carry on its educational work." Cobb v.
Howard University, 106 F.2d 860, 865 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 611 (1939).
5. McHugh, Faculty Unionism and Tenure, inFACULTYTENURE, supra note 1, at 195.
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programs at public institutions are generally created by regulation or
bylaw rather than by statute.6 Tenure at private institutions is gener-
ally established by contract, and a substantial number of community
and junior colleges utilize a term-contract system in lieu of tenure.7
Apart from these observations, few generalizations can be made about
tenure plans. As Professors Clark Byse and Louis Joughin sum-
marize:8
Tenure is embodied in a bewildering variety of policies, plans and
practices; the range reveals extraordinary differences in generosity,
explicitness and intelligibility. Large or small, public or private, non-
sectarian or religiously affiliated, there is no consensus concerning
either the criteria or the procedures for acquiring and terminating
tenure.
Although, as of 1972, 94% of all faculty members in American
universities and colleges served at institutions recognizing tenure in
one form or another, 9 the legal status of academic tenure remains un-
clear. Relatively few cases have come before the courts, and no pat-
tern in treatment is evident. Indeed, the judiciary has often com-
pounded the confusion. As one writer observed, "[r] eluctance, amor-
phousness, a substantial degree of diversity, and even a modicum of
whimsy have marked judicial conceptions and appraisals of tenure
over the years."1 0 Since tenure continues to play a prominent role in
higher education, legal solutions will be sought to the problems asso-
ciated with its acquisition, termination and attendant procedural safe-
guards. This article will examine the existing judicial authority on the
legal status of academic tenure at the college level. The article begins
with a discussion of acquisition of tenure and proceeds to analyze ob-
6. There are some exceptions. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 24306, 24308, 24309
(West Supp. 1974). Wisconsin provides a tenure system for all teachers in any:
state university .... Employment shall be permanent, during efficiency and good
behavior after appointment and acceptance ... for a sixth consecutive year ....
The employment of a teacher who has become permanently employed ...may
not be terminated involuntarily except for cause upon written charges ....
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 37.3 1(I) (Supp. 1974).
7. See FACULTY TENURE, supra note 1, at 219-21.
8. BYsE & JOuGHIN, supra note 2, at 133.
9. W. FURNiss, FACULTY TENURE AND CONTRACT SYSTEMS-CURRENT PRACTICE 1
(American Council on Education Special Report 1972), cited in FACULTY TENURE,
supra note 1, at 1.
10. Rosenblum, Legal Dimensions of Tenure, in FACULTY TENURE, supra note I,
at 160.
598
Vol. 50: 597, 1975
Academic Tenure
stacles to its enforcement and grounds for dismissal from a tenured
position, together with the procedural protections which must accom-
pany dismissal.
I. ACQUISITION OF TENURE
Full and "legitimate" tenure is gained through fulfillment of the
prescribed standards of the respective institution. Ordinarily, the re-
ceipt of tenure after a probationary period is not automatic,11 but
requires the adoption by the governing board of a favorable recom-
mendation of faculty and administrative officers.
A faculty member may obtain tenure contrary to the wishes of the
employing institution, however. Tenure can be acquired "by de-
fault"12 if the institution fails to follow its own rules of tenure, e.g., by
not notifying ineligible candidates or not issuing conditional contracts
within the requisite time span. So too, if the qualification for tenure is
ambiguous, interpretation of the standard will generally lie against the
college or university. Two recent examples of the acquisition of tenure
"by default" were presented in Bruno v. Detroit Institute of Technol-
ogy 13 and Chung v. Park.14
In Bruno, the institution's policy provided that a faculty member
"shall be considered to hold tenure" if he or she: (1) adequately per-
forms his or her duties for three consecutive years; (2) is assigned the
rank of associate or full professor; and (3) accepts a fourth annual
contract.1 5 The Michigan Court of Appeals held that any professor
meeting these qualifications has tenure even though the institution
does not affirmatively confer that status, and indeed chooses to termi-
nate the professor's employment. 16 A lack of any criticism of perform-
ance during the period of employment, coupled with yearly renewal of
contracts and promotion of the faculty member were considered to be
inconsistent with any assertion of dissatisfaction by the institution.
Chung v. Park concerned a Pennsylvania state college's tenure policy
11. See Sheppard v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 378 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.W. Va.
1974).
12. But cf. Cusumano v. Ratchford, 507 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1974).
13. 51 Mich. App. 593, 215 N.W.2d 745 (1974).
14. 369 F. Supp. 959 (M.D. Pa. 1974). The legal controversy between the parties
continued. 377 F. Supp. 524 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
15. 215 N.W.2d at 747.
16. Id. at 748.
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which provided for a three-year probationary period after which the
professor was to be dismissed, tenured or granted an additional two-
year probationary period with specific requirements for obtaining
tenure at the end of that period. A federal district court in Pennsyl-
vania held that a professor who was neither released after three years
of probation nor given specific requirements to meet during his fourth
and fifth probationary years obtained tenure, notwithstanding con-
trary wishes of the institution. 17 General expressions of concern by the
president to the faculty member regarding classroom teaching were
not sufficient to qualify as "requirements"; there must be a set of goals
which the faculty member must meet. Tenure was recognized in this
instance even though the teacher was aware that the intention of the
college was not to grant tenure but to place him on extended proba-
tion.
"De facto tenure," not formal tenure but the right to procedural
due process before the termination of employment, may be obtained if
a school's written and unwritten policies or practices grant qualifying
employees a concrete expectancy that their future employment is
secure. In Perry v. Sindermann,18 a college teacher claimed reliance
upon a provision in the college's faculty guide which stated that the
administration "wishes the faculty member to feel that he has perma-
nent tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long
as he displays a cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his
superiors, and as long as he is happy in his work." In addition, he
pointed to guidelines promulgated by the governing board which pro-
vided that one who had been employed as a teacher in the system for
seven years or more had some kind of job security, notwithstanding
the presence of a formal disclaimer of a tenure system. The United
States Supreme Court held that a teacher alleging reliance upon poli-
cies and practices of this nature must have the opportunity to prove
his claim. A mere subjective "expectancy" of employment is not suffi-
cient by itself to require the application of procedural due process
protection, but de facto tenure may be implied in an "understanding"
fostered by the educational institution.1 9
17. 369 F. Supp. at 966. The tenure regulation in issue was described as a "para-
digm of turbidity." Id. at 965.
18. 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972).
19. Id. at 602-03.
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II. OBSTACLES TO ENFORCEMENT
Once a professor has acquired tenure, obstacles may arise to the
enforcement of rights as a tenured faculty member.20 The school offi-
cials may have lacked the authority to enter into a tenure agreement,
and, if the institution is governed by a statute providing for "removal
at will," the professor may find that the tenure agreement provides
little security against dismissal. A professor in a private institution
faces additional problems with respect to enforcement of tenure
rights.
A. Constitutional Power to Control
In Worzella v. Board of Regents,21 the Supreme Court of South
Dakota invalidated a tenure plan on the basis that it improperly lim-
ited the governing board's power to deal with employees. Worzella
had qualified for tenure under a policy adopted by the Board of Re-
gents of South Dakota State College. He was dismissed from his fac-
ulty position, contrary to the tenure policy, without complaint, notice
or hearing allegedly for involvement in personal disputes and insubor-
dination.22 The court interpreted the tenure policy to provide that the
board could not discharge or remove a faculty member with tenure if
the president of the college refused to file a complaint or if the presi-
dent and the tenure committee failed or refused to recommend dis-
missal.23 The tenure policy was held invalid as an unlawful delegation
of authority since it was in conflict with a provision in the state con-
stitution declaring the college to be "under the control of' 24 the board
20. Legal protection of tenure is insubstantial. Judicial reluctance to decree
specific performance of 'personal service' contracts, charter provisions authoriz-
ing discharge at will, disclaimer and finality clauses, confusing uncertainty in the
written plans of some institutions, the complete absence of formal plans in
others, the vagueness and inclusiveness of termination criteria, and retention of
ultimate decisional authority by most governing boards-all underscore the haz-
ards of reliance on judicial protection of tenure.
Byse & Joughin, Tenure in American Higher Education: Specific Conclusions and
Recommendations, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 213-14 (L. Joughin ed. 1967).
21. 77 S.D. 447, 93 N.W.2d 411 (1958). The opinion is criticized in Byse, Aca-
demic Freedom, Tenure, and the Law: A Comment on Worzella v. Board of Regents,
73 HARv. L. REV. 304 (1959).
22. 93 N.W.2d at 412.




of regents. Thus, the board's power of removal was absolute; it could
not be restricted by the tenure program.
The power-to-control rationale was also utilized by the Supreme
Court of North Dakota to limit a board regulation under which a
teacher could be removed only for cause after a hearing. 25 The board
of higher education, under the state constitution, was given "full
authority over the institutions under its control. '26 Therefore, accord-
ing to the court, the regulation could not prevent the board's "right to
discharge . . . without assigning cause for . . . removal and without
a hearing, if it saw fit to do S0. ' 27
B. Removal-at-Will Statutes
The governing boards of some institutions of higher education are
empowered to remove faculty members when the interest of the school
"requires" it.2 8 Despite such broad discretion, some governing boards
have adopted tenure and related employment policies which restrict
their blanket authority. These self-imposed limitations have been de-
clared ineffective by some courts on grounds that the governing
board's authority may not be compromised in this manner and that
such limitations unlawfully bind future board members and future
decision making by the present board.2 9
Other decisions, however, have limited the effect of statutory "at
will" provisions by finding that the presence of the restrictions does
not disable a governing board from effectively contracting not to
remove a teacher unreasonably or arbitrarily.30 Thus, a board can
make reasonable agreements for the contractual terms of faculty
members. What is "reasonable" remains in question, but this treat-
25. Posin v. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 86 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 1957).
26. Id. at 34.
27. Id. at 36. A hearing was, in fact, held. The suit was by writ of certiorari to
review the discharge.
28. E.g., the relevant statute, later amended, interpreted in State ex rel. Hunsicker
v. Board of Regents, 209 Wis. 83, 244 N.W. 618 (1932), allowed the board to "re-
move at pleasure."
29. E.g., State ex rel..Hunsicker v. Board of Regents, 209 Wis. 83, 244 N.W. 618
(1932); Hyslop v. Board of Regents, 23 Idaho 341, 129 P. 1073 (1913); Devol v.
Board of Regents, 6 Ariz. 259, 56 P. 737 (1899). A number of relevant authorities
are discussed in Cobb v. Howard Univ., 106 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 611 (1939).
30. See, e.g., State Bd. of Agriculture v. Meyers, 20 Colo. App. 139, 77 P. 372
(1904); Board of Regents v. Mudge, 21 Kan. 169 (1878).
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ment of the statutory restriction makes an action for damages for
breach of contract available to a teacher for premature dismissal even
though the ultimate power to discharge remains basically inviolate.
C. Private Institutions and Contract
While action by a governing board which is contrary to a tenure
plan may result in an order of reinstatement for the faculty member at
a public institution, the tenured employee at a private institution may
face difficulty in attempting to acquire reinstatement as a result of the
judiciary's reluctance to specifically enforce personal service con-
tracts. The basis for any legal claim to tenure at a private institution is
limited to contract since there is no statutory protection.31 Often
rights similar to those found in tenure systems are contained in the
bylaws or regulations of private institutions. The teacher's contract
may provide that dismissal will be only for reasons set forth in a
tenure program; thus, dismissal contrary to the plan will be a breach
of the contract.
Proving that the policy was indeed a part of the contract may con-
stitute an initial obstacle to claiming the benefit of tenure provisions.32
But, even assuming that a binding obligation between a faculty
member and a college or university is established, there has been little
judicial support for a remedy for breach of contract beyond an action
for damages. Specific performance of a personal service contract is
generally denied because of the traditional equitable rule that the con-
tinuance of a close and undesirable personal relationship will not be
compelled.33 This is so even though money damages may not be a
legally adequate remedy where the college faculty member has had a
career damaged by loss of employment.3 4
31. With reference to legal protection of tenure at private institutions, see generally
Davis, Enforcing Academic Tenure: Reflections and Suggestions, 1961 Wis. L. REv.
200, 204-08; Note, Judicial Review of the Tenure Contract of a Professor in a Pri-
vate College, 25 OHIo ST. Li. 289 (1964).
32. See BYSE & JoUGHN, supra note 2, at 78, 82-84.
33. See, e.g., Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609, 615 (D.D.C. 1967),
remanded for proof and recovery of damages in 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
34. An action for damages leaves the teacher out of work even if he or she ulti-
mately prevails. If other employment is taken, the mitigation principle is applicable.
See, e.g., Bruno v. Detroit Institute of Technology, 51 Mich. App. 593, 215 N.W.2d
745, 749 (1974). For the teacher at a public institution, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity may prevent recovery. Cf. Kondos v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 318 F.
Supp. 394 (S.D.W. Va. 1970). However, actions for damages against public educa-
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An exception to the general rule was applied by the Chancery
Court of New Jersey in American Association of University Professors
v. Bloomfield College,35 in which tenured personnel at a private col-
lege had been dismissed on the basis of a "financial exigency" found
unsupported by the evidence. The court ordered reinstatement of the
faculty members. Termination had not been based upon any dissatis-
faction with the services rendered, but ostensibly only on reasons of
financial stress; therefore, the dangers of requiring an educational in-
stitution to hire or maintain one deemed undesirable or incompatible
were absent. The court concluded that the fact that a private institu-
tion was involved did not preclude specific performance, particularly
when reinstatement to public institutions through the use of man-
damus amounted to nothing more than compelling adherence to aca-
demic tenure commitments. 36
Other contractual pitfalls which, in particular instances, could af-
fect the tenure protection of a teacher at a private institution include:
(1) provisions disclaiming a legal obligation on the part of the coll-
ege;37 (2) allegations of a lack of "mutuality" in the contract based
upon the teacher's freedom to refuse a proferred position; 38 (3) lack of
authority of administrative officials to adopt a tenure plan; 39 and (4)
for informal plans, failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds.40
III. DISMISSAL OF TENURED TEACHERS
A. Cause
Under the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure41 of the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP), the service of teachers with tenure "should only be termi-
tional institutions have been recognized. See, e.g., Colorado School of Mines v. Neigh-
bors, 119 Colo. 399, 203 P.2d 904 (1949).
35. 129 N.J. Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846 (1974).
36. 322 A.2d at 859.
37. See Bradley v. New York Univ., 124 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd,
283 App. Div. 671, 127 N.Y.S.2d 815, aff'd mem. 307 N.Y. 620, 120 N.E.2d 828
(1954). See also BYSE & JOUGHIN, supra note 2, at 84-91.
38. See, e.g., State ex rel. Keeney v. Ayers, 108 Mont. 547, 92 P.2d 306 (1939)
(dissent).
39. Cf. Trustees of State Normal School v. Wightman, 93 Colo. 226, 25 P.2d 193
(1933).
40. Cf. Brookfield v. Drury College, 139 Mo. App. 339, 123 S.W. 86 (1909).
41. The Statement is reproduced in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 33-38
(L. Joughin ed. 1967).
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nated for adequate cause, except in the case of retirement for age, or
under extraordinary circumstances because of financial exigencies."
"Adequate cause" is not defined in particular terms, but there are ref-
erences to "incompetence" and "moral turpitude."42 In the 1958
Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceed-
ings,43 the AAUP made no attempt to define cause and left such a de-
termination to the individual institutions.44 A 1971 study of the status
of tenure policies in public colleges and universities, however, re-
vealed that only about half of the 80 institutions surveyed provided
specific criteria for the discharge of tenured faculty.45 Of these, the
most common were immorality, misconduct, professional incompe-
tence, neglect of duty, criminal involvement and incapacity. A ma-
jority of the remaining institutions in the survey did not enlarge upon
the provision of dismissal for "cause."
Aside from cases involving constitutional questions, there has been
relatively little litigation dealing with the reasons for faculty dismissal.
The paucity of litigation and consequent lack of definition for cause is
explained by the fact that formal dismissal proceedings for faculty
members have been a rarity. The Commission on Academic Tenure in
Higher Education 46 advocated "work toward a broadly acceptable
definition" to avoid a judicial determination of institutional policy or
elaborate code adoption by the academic community. In its recom-
mendation, the Commission stated that "adequate cause" should be
restricted to (1) demonstrated incompetence or dishonesty in teaching
or research, (2) substantial and manifest neglect of duty and (3) per-
sonal conduct which substantially impairs the individual's fulfillment
of his or her institutional responsibilities. 47
Although generally courts have not been helpful in defining what
conduct justifies the termination of a faculty member, they have made
it clear that dismissal for engaging in constitutionally protected ac-
tivity is not permitted. 48 In other situations, courts have not been as
42. Id. at 38.
43. Id. at 40-45.
44. Id. at 41.
45. SHAW, supra note 2, at 62-65.
46. The Commission was sponsored by the Association of American Colleges and
the AAUP in 1971 to conduct a general inquiry into academic tenure. Its report and
recommendations are contained in FACULTY TENURE, supra note 1.
47. Id. at 75.
48. See Part III-B infra.
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concerned with the substantive charge as with the process accorded or
have made a decision on a basis other than an examination of the al-
leged reasons for termination. 49
Some courts, however, have considered the issue of adequate cause.
A complaint charging "insubordination" filed against a University of
Nevada professor led to an order for his dismissal by the governing
board in State ex rel. Richardson v. Board of Regents.50 The professor
opposed a change in admission standards, which the president appar-
ently supported, and distributed to his colleagues copies of a magazine
article critical of "professional educators." He also stated at a meeting
of the local AAUP chapter that he was surprised to see the number
there "in view of the unfair and unwarranted criticism of the [organi-
zation] made by the president this afternoon."51 Defining "insubordi-
nation" as conduct which "imparts a willful disregard of express or
implied direction, or such a defiant attitude as to be equivalent there-
to,"52 the Nevada Supreme Court found inadequate support in the
record to provide cause for removal. The court classified the question
of cause for removal as one of "law."' 53 Although granting "full recog-
nition of the right of the regents to weigh the evidence, to pass upon
the credibility of the witnesses, to commit procedural errors not going
to the jurisdiction, and to be the finders of facts relevant to the is-
sues, 5 the court subjected the charges and the evidence to a sub-
stantially independent review.
Whether there is "cause" for removal may be determined partially
by statutory provisions for tenure. In Wisconsin ex rel. Ball v. Mc-
Phee,55 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a state statute guar-
anteeing tenure "during efficiency and good behavior" made illegal
any discharge for a reason unrelated to efficiency and good behavior.
The court stated that comments by a faculty member criticizing the
graduate program of the institution and attempts to dissuade gradu-
ates of the institution from accepting teaching employment within the
49. See Koch v. Board of Trustees, 39 I11. App. 2d 51, 187 N.E.2d 340 (1962),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 989 (1964).
50. 70 Nev. 347, 269 P.2d 265 (1954); see also the earlier opinion of the Nevada
Supreme Court reversing the trial court's dismissal of the same case, 70 Nev. 144,
261 P.2d 515 (1953).
51. 269 P.2d at 270.
52. Id. at 276.
53. ld. at 268.
54. Id. at 276.
55. 6 Wis. 2d 190, 94 NW.2d 711 (1959).
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state did not qualify as grounds for dismissal under the statute.5 6 The
court also rejected the claim of the state college that it possessed un-
reviewable discretion to determine what conduct constituted "good
cause" for dismissal.
Other decisions have supported the discharge of college faculty on
the basis of charges of "evident unfitness for service," 57 "doubt as to
future usefulness,"58 "refusal to follow a prescribed teaching sched-
ule,"' 59 "incompetency and intransigence," 60 and refusal to answer
questions posed by an institution regarding communist party member-
ship. 61
B. Constitutional and Statutory Rights
Although a tenured professor may be dismissed for cause, termina-
tion of employment or denial of tenure may not proceed on the basis
of "race, color, religion, sex or national origin," 62 nor upon the asser-
tion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution:63
[The Government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his [or her] interest in freedom of speech. For if the
government could deny a benefit to a person because of his [or her]
constitutionally protected speech or associations, his [or her] exercise
of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited ...
Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.
Protection of the constitutional rights of faculty members at public
56. Id. at 718-19.
57. Palos Verde Unified School Dist. v. Hensey, 9 Cal. App. 3d 967, 88 Cal. Rptr.
570 (1970) (vulgarity in the classroom indicative of "evident unfitness to teach"
within the meaning of California statute). A tenured member of the faculty of Comp-
ton Junior College in California was dismissed on the statutory charges of "im-
morality" and "evident unfitness to teach" after being found by a policeman in a
parked car in a state of undress with a student, assaulting a policeman and attempting
to escape. Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, 16 Cal. App. 3d 820, 94 Cal. Rptr. 318
(1971). See Comment, Unfitness to Teach: Credential Revocation and Dismissal for
Sexual Conduct, 61 CALIF. L. Rnv. 1442 (1973).
58. Dougherty v. Walker, 349 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
59. Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomfield State College, 358 F. Supp. 430
(M.D. Pa. 1973).
60. Chung v. Park, 377 F. Supp. 524 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
61. David v. University of Kansas City, 129 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
62. 42 -U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970). Cf. Jaroch v. Board of Regents, 372 F. Supp.
106, 108 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
63. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,597-98 (1972).
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institutions is independent of their tenure status. 64 Indeed, the nonten-
ured instructor and even the teacher hired with no formal contract but
with clearly implied promises of continued employment are equally
secure against discharge for the exercise of a protected right as is the
person who has earned continuing employment under a tenure sys-
tem.65 Thus, the following discussion applies alike to tenured and non-
tenured professors.
In many instances, the exercise of a protected interest is alleged by
the teacher as being the real reason for attempted termination,
whereas the institution may point to other, independent factors. 66 The
difficulty is compounded by the fact that often the reasons for dissatis-
faction with a teacher involve matters of speech, association, political
or social activity. There may at times be honest dispute regarding the
classification of activity as "protected," and the chances for protected
speech being intermingled with unprotected activity can be significant,
with a judicial sorting-out process required:67
[I] f, judged by constitutional standards, there are valid as well as in-
valid reasons for the discipline or discharge of a teacher, such disci-
pline or discharge will not be set aside by the federal court so long as
the invalid reasons are not the primary reasons or motivation for the
discharge.
In theory at least, a teacher may speak freely on matters of public
concern without fear of retaliatory sanction by his or her employing
institution. In Pickering v. Board of Education,68 plaintiff wrote a
letter containing alleged falsehoods to the editor of a local newspaper.
In the letter, plaintiff challenged the manner in which the school
board had handled revenue raising proposals. The board dismissed
64. Id. at 598.
65. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (state statutes
banning state employment of any person advocating or distributing material which
advocates the forceful overthrow of the government unconstitutionally vague); John-
son v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967)
(school board not free to exercise its discretion whether to rehire teacher in an arbi-
trary or racially discriminatory manner).
66. E.g., Watts v. Board of Curators, 495 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1974); Lewis v.
Spencer, 369 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D. Tex.), affd, 490 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1974) (discharge
not in retaliation for appearance at legislature or participation in local teacher orga-
nization but for failure to accept new position).
67. Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 900, 916 (D. Ariz. 1972).
68. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). An analysis of cases subsequent to the decision is con-
tained in Note, Judicial Protection of Teachers' Speech: the Aftermath of Pickering,
59 IOWA L. REv. 1256 (1974).
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plaintiff on grounds that the letter was "detrimental to the efficient
operation and administration of the schools of the district. '69 In
holding that plaintiffs removal infringed upon his freeclom of speech,
the United States Supreme Court stated in regard to the Illinois su-
preme court opinion which had sustained the dismissal:70
[T) o the extent that the ...opinion may be read to suggest that
teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment
on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the
public schools in which they work, it proceeds on a premise that has
been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court.
The Court, however, did not establish an unlimited right on the
part of a teacher to be critical of superiors or to speak on any subject
or under all circumstances. Recognizing that the "State has interests as
an employer in regulating the speech of the citizenry in general, 71 the
Court announced a "balancing test" by which the teacher's interest as
a private citizen in commenting on matters of public concern was to
be weighed against the interests of the state "as an employer, in pro-
moting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees. '7 2
Several cases since Pickering have dealt with the dismissal of
teachers as a result of incidents associated with speech. These cases
underscore the difficulty in attempting to determine when dismissal of
a faculty member will lie for reasons which arguably include exercise
of protected rights. In Duke v. North Texas State University,73 a
teaching assistant's dismissal was upheld on the charge of making
speeches using profanity before a group of students and criticizing
university administrators and policies. According to the institution's
findings, the statements in the setting of a meeting held in violation of
university regulations "impaired her efficiency as a teacher and her
judgment as a scholar."74 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
supported the university's "interests" to "maintain a competent faculty
69. 391 U.S. at 564.
70. Id. at 568.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972).
74. Id. at 832.
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and to perpetuate public confidence in the educational institution,"75
both of which had been infringed upon by the assistant's activities.
An assistant professor with "stability of employment" at Arizona
State University was dismissed by the board of regents in Starsky v.
Williams7 6 for "general unfitness" after a series of alleged "unprofes-
sional acts," including an unexcused class cancellation and several
extramural or public activities in which speech played an important
role. The federal court, in a civil rights action, found that the termina-
tion violated the teacher's right of free speech. The facts showed some
unprotected speech activity among the university's charges, but the
court determined it must decide whether the substantial or primary
cause of the discharge was impermissible. 77 The court utilized a
process of tabulation: eight specific charges had insufficient evidence
and some constitutional protection, while two incidents were estab-
lished by the facts. With reference to public speech by the teacher as a
citizen, the court suggested that "an extremely strong or unusual case
of efficiency would have to be made to outweigh a citizen's interest" 78
and, further, that a narrower professional standard could not be ap-
plied.79 Even the strongest criticism of a remote employer (in this case
a governing board) may not be sufficient to rule out a first amendment
right of a teacher. "Constitutionally protected criticism" should not be
confused with "disrespect," according to the court.80
The dismissal of several faculty members and administrative offi-
cials from the Oklahoma College of Liberal Arts was overturned by
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Rampey v. Allen.81
"Divisiveness" was the reason given for the termination by the institu-
tion, where a tenure system had been recently abolished. 82 The major-
ity, after reviewing the testimony in the record, concluded, however,
that the explanation was "frivolous." The true and unacceptable rea-
sons for the dismissal were held to be "disapproved association, or
75. Id. at 839.
76. 353 F. Supp. 900 (D. Ariz. 1972).
77. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
78. 353 F. Supp. at 923.
79. Id. at 920.
80. Id. at 924.
81. 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974), cerl. denied, 95 S. Ct. 827 (1975).
82. "As we view it, the tenure issue enters into this case to the extent that it pro-
vides some insight regarding the alleged arbitrariness of the [college administrators]."
Id. at 1094.
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disapproval of statements made, or on account of [the college pres-
ident's] disagreement with [the teachers'] philosophies .... ,,83
C. Financial Exigency
The recent economic downturn and declining enrollment in some
collegiate institutions have raised a serious challenge to the employ-
ment security of faculty members. Under these circumstances, tenure
provides "no guarantee against becoming a casualty to institutional
change."'84 Termination of tenured employment because of financial
exigency, "under extraordinary circumstances,"85 has long been con-
sidered legitimate, but until recently it has not been a serious prospect
at most institutions. Courts uphold the dismissal of tenured faculty if
the financial distress of an institution is sufficiently serious to necessi-
tate personnel cutbacks and if reasonable procedural safeguards ac-
company the process of selecting which faculty members are to be re-
leased.86
The question whether a private college's financial status necessi-
tated the abolition of tenure was presented recently to a chancery
court in New Jersey in AAUP v. Bloomfield College.87 For reasons
of alleged financial exigency, the employment of some tenured faculty
members was terminated, and tenure was abolished for professors
who were retained. On review, the court recognized the "poor" eco-
nomic health of the college, but held that faculty cutbacks could not
be justified on the basis of a bare allegation of "financial exigency."
The college board of trustees must show that an immediate financial
benefit could be expected from the abrogation of tenure for all fac-
ulty; it is not a sufficient justification that action be taken "in the
[bona fide] belief that the measure would in some degree advance the
83. Id. at 1099.
84. W. Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary Explanation and "Defense," 57 A.A.U.P.
BULL. 328, 329 (1971).
85. The reference is to the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom
and Tenure, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 33 (L. Joughin, ed. 1967).
86. See text accompanying notes 91-94 infra.
87. 129 NJ. Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846 (1974). The abrogation of tenure for con-
tinuing faculty members was to be carried out under a policy providing that "Termina-
tion of continuous appointment because of financial exigency of the institution must
be demonstrably bona fide." 322 A.2d at 848.
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financial fortunes of the institution." 8 8 The court concluded that the
institution failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of finan-
cial exigency. The financial problem was identified as merely one of
liquidity which had plagued the college for many years. Moreover, the
hiring of new faculty members after firing tenured personnel weak-
ened the school's claim of financial exigency and was not justified by
the alleged need for a "modified curriculum." The court seemed con-
vinced that the dismissal was a subterfuge, designed to abolish the
tenure system rather than to alleviate an immediate financial crisis.8 9
Even though they had tenure, plaintiffs in Levitt v. Board of Trus-
tees of Nebraska State Colleges90 found their continued employment
unprotected. The 1973 Nebraska state budget necessitated a reduction
in the number of faculty members at Peru State College. At the direc-
tion of the governing board, the acting president of the college, in as-
sociation with his academic deans, prepared a list of criteria on which
faculty members could be evaluated and retained or released. Consid-
eration was given to retaining those faculty members necessary to staff
the "most necessary programs at the college."91 Hearings were pro-
vided before a faculty grievance committee and the governing board.
A federal district court upheld the dismissal of tenured faculty mem-
bers, finding that the process utilized was "fair and reasonable."
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin took substantially the same posi-
tion in Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin
System,92 a case concerning faculty layoffs. There, the court stated
that the release of tenured personnel would be upheld so long as a fair
opportunity was provided to demonstrate that the true reasons were
not constitutionally impermissible or wholly arbitrary and unreason-
88. 322 A.2d at 854. The court selected a test "to effectuate the intent of the
parties" and declared to be "materially comparable to that used for judicial review of
cases involving the discharge of tenured teachers for cause":
whether the action taken followed from the board's demonstrably bona fide belief,
under honestly formulated standards, in the existence of a financial exigency and
extraordinary attendant circumstances, and in the necessity for terminating ten-
ured faculty members as a means of relieving the exigent condition.
Id. at 855.
89. Id. at 856-57.
90. 376 F. Supp. 945 (D. Neb. 1974). Where an institution sets procedural guide-
lines for a tenured employee whose contract is not renewed because of "financial
exigency," the formal proceedings must be followed explicitly. University of Alaska v.
Chauvin, 521 P.2d 1234, 1238-39 (Alas. 1974).
91. 376 F. Supp. at 949.
92. 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
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able.93 The court concluded, however, that there is no constitutional
requirement that tenured faculty participate in all stages of the general
decisionmaking process of reduction for fiscal reasons. The court
upheld the dismissal of tenured faculty although under state law fac-
ulty employment was "permanent, during efficiency and good behav-
ior" and could not be terminated involuntarily "except for cause."94
D. Vagueness of Dismissal Charges
Dismissal charges should be sufficiently specific to fulfill the dual
requirements of enabling the professor to respond and providing a
definite standard by which the professor's conduct can be evaluated. 95
Although statutory precision for standards governing faculty dismissal
has not often been deemed necessary, a federal district court in Ne-
vada did require greater specificity in charges for the dismissal of a
tenured professor in Adamian v. University of Nevada.96 The plain-
tiff, a professor at the university, was discharged for violating a provi-
sion of the University Code which obligated faculty members "to be
accurate, to exercise appropriate restraint, to show respect for the
opinions of others and to make every effort to indicate that he [or
she] is not a spokesman for this University. '97 The court held that this
regulation was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and therefore
it infringed upon the rights of free speech and assembly. The range of
constitutionally protected activities which could be infringed by the
regulation was "unlimited"; 98 utterances which were "inaccurate"
could be the basis for termination.
Courts display varying degrees of tolerance for vague charges af-
fecting academic personnel. To one court,99 a public school teacher's
dismissal for "immorality" was invalid because the term was not de-
fined and "may be applied so broadly that every teacher in the state
93. Id. at 238.
94. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 37.31(1)(a), (b) (Supp. 1974). No provision is made for
the reduction or layoff of faculty members for financial exigency.
95. See Note, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal Courts: A Focus on the Mili-
tary, Prison and Campus Contexts, 26 STAN. L. RaV. 855, 883-85 (1974).
96. 359 F. Supp. 825 (D. Nev. 1973).
97. The provision was taken from the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure of the AAUP. See note 41 supra.
98. 359 F. Supp. at 830.
99. Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 1973).
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could be subject to discipline .. "..",,00 On the other hand, a federal
district court held in Dougherty v. Walker'0 ' that the phrase "doubt
as to future usefulness" was not vague and overbroad as applied to the
facts. The court found, in a summary judgment action in connection
with the midterm dismissal of a visiting professor, that there was
ample evidence from which university officials could question "useful-
ness." The teacher had addressed a letter of concern to the university
chancellor, disseminated the letter to the press, conducted a hunger
strike and publicly shaved his head, caused students to transfer from
his classes and attempted to stop the institution's marching band while
it was participating in a parade sponsored by an organization which
he considered racist. The relevant portion of the regulations provided
that "the cause for removal shall be only such as to seriously interfere
with a teacher's usefulness to the University.' I 0 2
A recent United States Supreme Court decision may weaken the
applicability of the vagueness doctrine to dismissal charges. In Arnett
v. Kennedy,10 3 a statute dealing with civil service employees provided
for discharge "only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the
service."' 10 4 A majority of the Court held that the standard was not
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. "Congress sought to lay down
an admittedly general standard, not for the purpose of defining crim-
inal conduct, but . . .to give . . .different federal employees per-
forming widely disparate tasks a common standard of job protection
.... 105 The standard was interpreted as excluding constitutionally
protected speech106
IV. PROCEDURAL PROTECTION FOR THE TENURED
Assuming there are adequate grounds for removal of a tenured fac-
ulty member, what procedural safeguards must accompany the dis-
missal process? Basic to any tenure plan for academic personnel is the
requirement that before dismissal or contract nonrenewal, procedural
100. Id. at 255.
101. 349 F. Supp. 629, 646 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
102. Id. at 646.
103. 416 U.S. 134 (1974), reviewed in The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 83 (1974).
104. 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a)(1970).
105. 416 U.S. at 159.
106. Id. at 162.
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protection must be accorded. Varied protections are provided by
statute or regulation, including in some instances the use of profes-
sional peers in the evaluation of charges,' 07 but the fundamental core
is for the teacher to receive notice of the reasons given for termination
and an opportunity to respond to those reasons. Where an institu-
tional tenure policy outlines particular procedural standards, they
must be followed explicitly, 08 unless waived by the parties con-
cerned.' 09 Similarly, statutory prescriptions of due process require-
ments are mandatory."10
There are a number of collateral procedural benefits for tenured
professors, one of which is that the burden of proving "cause" for
dismissal is upon the institution."' As a consequence, the college or
university must marshall its charges carefully and avoid unsupported
allegations. The advantage to the faculty member is obvious. In con-
trast, where a nontenured person is contesting a refusal to renew a
contract, he or she carries the burden of proof."12 The distinction
between tenured and nontenured faculty persons is also significant in
that proceedings to dismiss a tenured faculty member must be initi-
ated by the employing institution, whereas proceedings to avoid termi-
nation of a contract for one lacking tenure who has received notice
that nonrenewal is contemplated must generally be initiated by the
nontenured individual. 1 3 In addition, in a tenure dismissal case,
" [t] he degree of formality in the total procedure is somewhat
heavier.""14
107. 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND TENURE 38 (L. Joughin ed. 1967). See also A. Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at
80-82.
108. [I] f the governmental agency has established discharge regulations the
agency must comply with those regulations as a matter of constitutional due
process even if the agency could have discharged the employee summarily with-
out a due process review.
Mabey v. Reagan, 376 F. Supp. 216, 223 (N.D. Cal. 1974). See also Bowing v. Board
of Trustees of Green River Community College Dist., 11 Wn. App. 33, 521 P.2d 220
(1974).
109. Chung v. Park, 377 F. Supp. 524 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (burden of proof as-
sumed by teacher).
110. State ex rel. Ball v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 94 N.W.2d 711 (1959).
111. Cf. Chung v. Park. 377 F. Supp. 524, 529 (M.D. Pa. 1974); AAUP v.
Bloomfield College, 129 NJ. Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846, 855 (1974).
112. See, e.g., Fluker v. Alabama St. Bd. of Educ., 441 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir.
1971). See also Frazier v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 495 F.2d 1149, 1153 (8th Cir.
1974).




A. The Roth and Sindermann Decisions
Apart from any institutional provision, a professor's entitlement to
procedural due process is dependent upon whether his or her employ-
ment status involves a liberty or property interest under the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. If the employment
status can fairly be characterized as tenure, minimum procedural
protections must be afforded to comply with due process. 115 This issue
was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Board of Regents
v. Roth" 6 and Perry v. Sindermann.117
In Roth, the Court held that failure to renew a nontenured profes-
sor's contract by itself did not deprive the professor of protected "lib-
erty" or "property." With respect to a claimed invasion of "liberty,"
the Court stated that "[i] t stretches the concept too far to suggest that
a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he [ or she] simply is not rehired
in one job but remains as free as before to seek another." 118 However,
the Court stated in dictum that procedural protections would be re-
quired if a significant collateral injury of larger legal consequence re-
sulted from the action of the educational employer, e.g., charges seri-
ously damaging a professor's standing and associations in the educa-
tion community' 9 or imposing a "stigma"' 20 which foreclosed other
employment opportunities. In regard to the property-right issue, the
Court concluded that, absent a state statute or university rule or policy
establishing an interest or claim to reemployment, there arises no
115. "Thus, it is irrelevant whether the University's tenure regulations provided
for a hearing . . .; the fourteenth amendment gives him certain hearing rights simply
because he had tenure per se." University of Alaska v. Chauvin, 521 P.2d 1234, 1238
(Alas. 1974).
116. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
117. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). These decisions have received widespread comment.
See, e.g., Rosenblum, supra note 10, at 163-80; W. Van Alstyne, The Supreme Court
Speaks to the Untenured, 58 A.A.U.P. BULL. 267 (1972); Note, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
882 (1973).
118. 408 U.S. at 575, citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895-96 (1961).
119. 408 U.S. at 573. In Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d
153 (8th Cir. 1973), the presence of racist charges against a teacher in his file was
considered the principal cause of nonreappointment and a deprivation of liberty.
120. 408 U.S. at 573. Since Roth, some courts have suggested that a finding of pro-
fessional incompetence would mandate a due process hearing. See, e.g., Whitney v.
Board of Regents, 355 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Wis. 1973). But see Blair v. Board of Re-
gents of State University & College System of Tenn., 496 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1974);
Jablon v. Trustees of the Cal. State Colleges, 482 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1973); Perkins
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 353 F. Supp. 618 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
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property interest sufficient to require the university authorities to pro-
vide a hearing prior to nonrenewal of a teacher's contract. 12 1 Thus to
have a property interest in a benefit, an individual "must have a legiti-
mate claim of entitlement to it."122 A tenured professor, with an in-
terest in continued employment, has such a property right, as does a
nontenured faculty member dismissed before the end of an agreed pe-
riod of employment.
In a companion case, Perry v. Sindermann, the Court recognized
the possibility of de facto tenure as a status sufficient to support a
claim for due process protection. Proof of a "property" interest in
continued employment-notwithstanding the absence of a formal
contractual tenure provision, and indeed, in the presence of a formal
disclaimer of a tenure system-was alleged by Professor Sindermann
on the basis of an "understanding" fostered by the college administra-
tion. The Court suggested that there may be an unwritten "common
law" in a particular institution, based on conduct, usage and commu-
nication that is tantamount to tenure even in the absence of an explicit
contractual reference. Proof of implied-in-fact tenure, but not a mere
subjective expectancy, could be sufficient to establish a property inter-
est, which in turn would trigger due process. 123
Although Roth and Sindermann involved professors who did not
have formal tenure, it is clear from these opinions that formal tenure
is a property interest which entitles the tenured professor to proce-
dural due process in removal proceedings.
B. Minimum Procedural Requirements
Once it is established that procedural due process is constitutionally
mandated in a removal proceeding, the applicability of specific proce-
dural protections must be examined. In Sindermann, the court
stated:124
[P] roof of ... a property interest... would obligate college officials
to grant a hearing at [the teacher's] request, where he [or she] could
be informed of the grounds for his [or her] nonretention and chal-
lenge their sufficiency.
121. 408 U.S. at 578.
122. Id. at 577.




Beyond these general rules, "the form of hearing required . . . by
procedural due process may be determined by assessing and balancing
the. . . particular interests" of the professor and the institution.125
In some respects, the procedural protections of tenure are "analo-
gous to fair hearing requirements . . . for the protection of various
kinds of status in the public sector . . . , to the statutory procedural
protection of civil servants, and to the grievance procedure conven-
tional in collective bargaining agreements.' 1 26 Thus, one might look
to cases in these areas to determine the content of a hearing pursuant
to possible removal of a tenured professor.' 27 In Goldberg v. Kelly,128
the Court concluded that due process in proceedings to deprive welfare
benefits demands timely and adequate notice, detailed reasons for
termination of benefits, an effective opportunity to defend by pre-
senting oral arguments, the right of confrontation, the right of coun-
sel, a statement of the decisionmaker's reasoning and of evidence re-
lied upon, as well as an impartial panel or judge. The critical nature
of the recipient's interests in continuation of benefits prompted the
requirement of a more elaborate hearing process.
A recent case involving the dismissal of a federal civil service em-
ployee is also instructive with reference to procedural standards. In
Arnett v. Kennedy,' 29 the Court held that the employee was protected
against arbitrary discharge under existing statutes and that the addi-
tional safeguard of a requested pretermination trial-type hearing was
therefore unnecessary. Relevant legislation permitted removal "only
for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service."' 30 In the
plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist concluded that by conferring a
right not to be discharged except for "cause" and concurrently condi-
tioning the grant of that right by specific procedural limitations,
125. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570. This balancing process has been described as a "judi-
cial 'cost-benefit' analysis." W. Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers
and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841, 864.
126. W. Van Alstyne, supra note 84, at 329.
127. See, e.g., (in addition to Roth and Sindermann) Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600 (1974) (sequestration of property to prevent waste); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation of parole); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972) (repossession of consumer goods); Bell v. Burson, 402 US. 535 (1971)
(revocation of a driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termin-
ation of welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(garnishment of wages).
128. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
129. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
130. 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1970), quoted, 416 U.S. at 140.
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"[Congress] did not create an expectancy of job retention in those
employees requiring procedural protection.., beyond that afforded
. . .by the statute and related agency regulations.'' A majority of
the justices, however, concluded that the facts demonstrated a prop-
erty interest requiring protection that could not be infringed upon
except by way of a proceeding which met independent due process
standards, and that the federal governmerit does not have unlimited
freedom to determine procedural safeguards to be accorded substan-
tive property rights bestowed.
As to the adequacy of the procedures available to Mr. Arnett, the
concurring and dissenting justices disagreed. Three would have re-
quired a pretermination evidentiary hearing; 13 2 the others would not
recognize such a requirement in the face of a system which provided
for written notice, an opportunity to file a written answer, the right to
appear personally before the deciding official and a written statement
of reasons for the decision. 33 At that stage of the proceedings, a full
hearing with cross-examination of witnesses could be provided or be
available later on appeal.
Although the cases discussed above are relevant, their factual set-
tings are distinguishable from faculty-tenure cases. Fortunately, there
is case authority which provides some insights into the minimum pro-
cedural requirements for proceedings affecting tenure. In Ferguson v.
Thomas,'34 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit listed the min-
imum procedural protections to be granted a teacher with an "expect-
ancy of reemployment" who opposed his termination for cause:13s
(1) he be advised of the cause or causes for his termination in suffi-
cient detail to fairly enable him to show any error that may exist;
(2) he be advised of the names and the nature of the testimony of wit-
nesses against him;
(3) at a reasonable time after such advice he must be accorded a
meaningful opportunity to be heard in his own defense;
(4) that hearing should be before a tribunal that both possesses some
academic expertise and has an apparent impartiality toward the
charges.
131. Id. at 163. Justice Rehnquist was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Stewart.
132. Id. at 206 (Marshall, Douglas and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
133. Id. at 164, 171 (Powell, Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part & concurring
in the result in part; White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
134. 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
135. Id. at 856.
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The court observed that the institutional hearing committee's failure
to hear witnesses requested by the professor, to provide a transcript or
written record and to make findings of fact "could deprive these pro-
ceedings of that necessary inherent fairness which due process de-
mands."' 3 6 In Chung v. Park, 37 dismissal proceedings for a tenured
professor were characterized by a federal district judge in Pennsyl-
vania as comporting with the "bare minima of 'due process'" when
the faculty member received a lengthy hearing during which he was
"fully able to cross-examine his accusers, subpoena witnesses, present
evidence, and, in effect, demand a full accounting from the college as
to whether the decision . . . to fire him was supported."'138 In a case
involving a nontenured faculty member, Ortwein v. Mackey, 3 9 a fed-
eral district court concluded that "under the guidelines set forth by
Goldberg, Sindermann and Roth, the active participation of counsel
at some pretermination hearing is necessary to accord . . . due
process of law.' 140 Thus, although the law does not appear to require
that a hearing with every judicial trapping be offered the college pro-
fessor threatened with employment termination, notice of charges, a
hearing with representation by counsel and the opportunity to present
and challenge evidence are basic to any dismissal procedure. Since the
degree of due process protection afforded varies legitimately with the
nature of the interest involved, strong arguments can be made that the
procedural protection for tenured teaching personnel should be maxi-
mized in a setting where "reputation, professional stature and liveli-
hood are at stake. ... 141
V. CONCLUSION
For a faculty member at an institution of higher education, tenure
remains a valuable asset, offering some assurance of stability and
employment protection. Certainly, a tenure system which provides for
peer evaluation in a disciplinary setting, for specific charges and for
an opportunity to respond to those charges stands as a bulwark
136. Id. at 857-58.
137. 377 F. Supp. 524 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
138. Id. at 529.
139. 358 F. Supp. 705 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
140. ld. at 714-15.
141. BYSE & JOUGHIN, supra note 2, at 124.
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against unsupported termination of service. Under a formal program,
carefully administered, the occasion for resort to the courts for resolu-
tion of employment decisions can be minimized.
The genuine disadvantages of an attempted legal solution to an
academic controversy involving tenure simply cannot be ignored. Fac-
tors as varied as the public or private nature of the institution, inter-
pretation of the statutory authority of the governing body, the ambi-
guity of tenure provisions, the adequacy of the procedural process
employed and the nature of the faculty activity which spawned the
disagreement have influenced judicial reception to tenure over the
years. Because of the resulting uncertainties, it would be a "serious
mistake to think of the legal dimensions of tenure as a series of spe-
cific codified rules or principles subject uniformly to enforcement in
the courts."' 42 In addition, the practical difficulties associated with
pursuing legal action present a formidable challenge to faculty mem-
bers entertaining the thought of legal remedy. Unless "possessed of
extraordinary fortitude,"' 43 many choose not to pursue a legal claim
after weighing the considerable problems of expense, delay and the
possible effect upon future teaching opportunities.
A recent countertendency is present, however. For tenured faculty
at public institutions, the law now recognizes a property interest de-
manding procedural protection against termination and new security
for the exercise of protected activities. To this extent, at least, the
legal value of tenure has been strengthened, and cases dealing with
institutional decisions in faculty personnel matters are being taken to
a judicial arena with increasing frequency.
How important is legally enforceable tenure? In their useful study
of tenure in higher education, Byse and Joughin stated that "assur-
ance of continuity of employment extended by an institution with a
long and honorable tradition of academic freedom and tenure often
will be much more meaningful than an express legal obligation grudg-
ingly assumed by a lesser institution."'' 44 They concluded, however,
that the availability of judicial review of a dismissal might operate as
a curb on the occasional "arbitrary" administrator or governing board
or strengthen the hand of their "conscientious" counterparts "when
142. Rosenblum, supra note 10, at 161.
143. W. Van Alystyne, supra note 125, at 859.
144. BYSE & JOUGHIN, supra note 2, at 74-75.
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inflamed public pressures unjustifiably seek the discharge of a
teacher. ' 145 Professor Victor Rosenblum agrees: "On the whole,
courts may be more effective as a looming presence to prevent cases
from arising than as an avenger to redress particular inequities." 146 In
view of the mixed record of judicial treatment of academic tenure, this
assessment is an accurate one.
145. Id. at 75.
146. Rosenblum, supra note 10, at 192.
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